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Abstract      
Our aim for this thesis is to study whether hedge fund performance persists after weak markets, and 
do the results differ from performance persistence after strong markets. We are interested in overall 
market situations’ impact on performance persistence of hedge funds. Our data is from Lipper TASS 
hedge fund database, with 18891 hedge funds and 1261782 observations from December 1993 to June 
2013. The data is modified so that we’ve cleared out non-USD funds, non-monthly filing funds, and 
funds with unknown strategy. We’ve also excluded the first 18 months of returns for every fund to 
control the backfill bias. This leaves us with 9107 funds. We divide the time series into periods of 
recessions and expansions based on the overall stock market situation. The main recession periods are 
the dot-com bubble from 31st May 2000 to 30th September 2002 and the financial crisis from 31st 
August 2007 to 28th February 2009. Otherwise the time periods between 30th June 1997 to 30th June 
2013 are considered as expansion periods. The main steps after cleaning our data are: First we 
calculate the logarithmic excess returns of the funds. Then we use the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor 
model over the past 12 months’ returns to estimate the time-varying t-value of alpha for each fund. 
Next we sort the funds into decile portfolios based on their t-values of alpha. After that we calculate 
the monthly equal-weighted returns for the decile portfolios using three-month and twelve-month 
holding periods. We also calculate the monthly equal-weighted returns for the spread portfolio 
between the top and bottom portfolios. Next, we calculate for the decile portfolios the annualized 
mean, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, t-value of Sharpe ratio, p-value of Sharpe ratio, annualized 
Fung-Hsieh seven-factor alpha, t-value of alpha and p-value of alpha. The null-hypothesis is that there 
is no difference in performance persistence after recession and expansion periods. What we can 
conclude from our results is that badly performing portfolios likely keep on performing badly despite 
the overall market situation, and even though there is some indications that the very best portfolios 
can make at least short-term profit even in bust periods, the performance is not persistent. We cannot 
identify the skilled fund managers from others by looking at hedge fund’s performance during market 
crisis. For further studies, the Lipper TASS database’s information of the hedge fund strategy 
categories could be used to identify the underlying factors in conditional performance persistence of 
hedge funds. 
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There’s been already two recessions in the 21st century, the IT-bubble in the early 
2000s and the financial crisis in 2008, the economy has not yet fully recovered from 
these and we are yet again facing another recession due to the coronavirus pandemic. 
So, in these uncertain times, is there a way to still make money? Are some hedge funds 
thriving in recessions and are their results consistent or just a fluke? These are the 
questions we are trying to explore in this thesis, or more formally, we are to study 
whether hedge fund performance persists conditionally. The condition here is the 
overall market situation divided into recessions and expansions. The interest is 
especially in performance persistence after recessions because one could assume that 
crisis separates the wheat from the chaff, also among hedge funds.  
The main inspiration for this thesis came from an article ‘Only winners in tough times 
repeat: Hedge fund performance persistence over different market conditions’ (Sun et 
al. 2016). The study shows that there exists predictability for hedge fund’s 
performance after weak markets but not after strong markets. When this thesis was 
started in 2017, there were no major signs of global recession, although the after effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis were still lingering, and there were growing tension 
between USA and China and fears of trade war. The financial markets were used to 
living in uncertainty and these whispers were not going to rock the boat. But what if 
there was some major global event lurking behind the corner, something that the 
markets can’t anticipate? What will happen to the hedge funds? They are supposed to 
be operated by the most qualified financial professionals and surely they should be the 
ones that can make even the direst conditions into opportunities. But what does the 
data say? We have abundant amounts of data from the hedge funds and the financial 
markets in general, and we already have had two recessions. So, how did hedge funds 
fare during those rough times? And did those hedge funds that were successful during 
crisis, continue to be successful during good times? The coronavirus pandemic, this 
was just the kind of situation, that was in mind when this thesis begun to form.  
A word about this COVID-19 and the comparison between this looming recession 
versus the past recessions. The mechanics of this recession are quite different than 
those of recent recessions. In the past the financial markets themselves were the origin 
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of the crisis, so the disruption was more in the realm of financials, and not directly in 
the real economy, although the effect rippled to common people’s lives via crashing 
market values of shares, or unpredictable increases in the housing loan interests. This 
resulted in a situation, where the demand decreased while the supply remained the 
same. Coronavirus pandemic originates from real life, it has direct impact on people’s 
lives, and this impacts the financial markets. Logistics worldwide are disrupted and 
while the demand is high on certain product areas, the supply and distribution can’t 
keep up with the demand. So the material flows are unbalanced, but so is the service 
sector because of restrictions of movement of people and precautionary measures in 
services that are still allowed to continue. 
Because this recession is so different from past recessions, the tools that hedge funds 
have used before may not be as effective this time. But we can analyze the data of past 
recessions, come to a conclusion about the results, and after this recession is over we 
can add valuable new data in our research, and see if some hedge funds actually can 
overcome market disturbances and hedge the investments against them. This is the 
ultimate question behind this thesis, and hopefully this topic is continued after this 
pandemic and its global effects are settled. What will be the new normal then? How 
will finance theories evolve to adapt in this new normal? The financial crisis brought 
us the reality of negative interests, this wasn’t supposed to be possible, but here we 
are, a decade later, comfortably adjusted to the idea. Is this pandemic going to be the 
start of big reforms in capitalism and free markets? 
Because of hedge funds’ short history, only recently there has been studies about 
different market conditions’ effects on hedge fund performance persistence. Does 
hedge fund’s performance persist differently after recessions than after expansions? 
The dot-com bubble and financial crisis have given a lot of data on which to study this 
question. 
The aim of this thesis is to study whether hedge fund performance persists after weak 
markets and does the results differ from performance persistence after strong markets. 
Further analysis of the hedge funds’ characteristics is also needed to understand the 
underlying reasons for the differences in the results. 
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The implication of the results could be that perhaps one can identify the skilled fund 
managers from others by looking at hedge fund’s performance during market crisis. 
This is important issue especially now that we are yet again facing financially 
uncertain times. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There has been numerous attempts of solving the mystery of hedge funds and what are 
the underlying forces of hedge fund performance and how to predict whether that 
performance will persist. Hedge funds differ from mutual funds by having much less 
regulation; hedge funds don’t have to report their returns, they use dynamic strategies, 
they can sell short, speculate with derivatives,  use leverage, and use lock-up periods. 
Hedge fund investors are either wealthy individuals or institutional investors. 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) assumes that the stock prices always reflect 
reality and take into account all available information, and there isn’t any chance of 
outperforming the market as the market is perfectly priced (Fama 1970). Under the 
assumptions of EMH, an investor can’t find any undervalued stocks, or time their 
investment, and the only way to make higher returns is to buy riskier assets.  
The EMH claims that the market always represents the fair value and therefore the best 
portfolios are those that passively follow the market and don’t have high management 
costs, such as hedge funds have. 
If the EMH was correct, then it would be impossible to make consistent risk-adjusted 
excess returns, also known as alpha. Real life suggests otherwise, there are well-known 
investors such as Warren Buffett and hedge funds that have been successful in their 
investments (Agarwall et al. 2013), but the question is, is that just luck? Is there 
reoccurring irregularities in the market that skilled individuals can spot and take 
advantage of, or are the gains of these individuals only outliers in the vast sea of market 
data, or perhaps due to some insider information that the public has no access to? 
The EMH is controversial, but large amount of research backs it up (Agarwall et al. 
2013, Basu 1977, Keane 1986, Lo 2007, Malkiel 2003, Sewell 2011, 2012). Only rare 
individuals have been generating consistent alphas and the rest would have been better 
off with passive investment portfolios. In the eyes of a finance student, the EMH is a 
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bit harsh, if it were absolutely true, then all the fundamental and technical analysis 
skills acquired through the studies would be pointless. 
The EMH is quite important in this thesis, as we are essentially testing whether it still 
holds when the performance persistence is viewed conditionally in bull and bear 
market conditions. Is there a way to recognize the consistently outperforming 
individuals or funds by looking how they’ve performed in different market conditions? 
2.2 Hedge fund vs. Mutual fund 
Hedge funds are actively managed alternative investments that invest their customer’s 
money in an effort to outperform the overall market or specified benchmark by using 
different and also non-traditional strategies and asset classes, such as investing in high 
risk derivatives, aggressive shorting, and using leverage. A hedge fund is usually a 
partnership, where the founders and fund managers are the general partners, and the 
investors are the limited partners. Hedge funds can differ from one another drastically, 
and they are often categorized according to their investment style. There are countless 
strategies the funds can employ, but the most common ones are long/short equity 
strategy, market neutral strategy, merger arbitrage strategy, convertible arbitrage 
strategy, capital structure arbitrage strategy, fixed-income arbitrage strategy, event-
driven strategy, global macro strategy, and short only strategy. 
Hedge fund’s name comes from their original purpose to hedge against the downside 
risks of bear market by shorting, but nowadays hedge funds focus more on maximizing 
profits than minimizing risks. 
Hedge funds are less regulated than mutual funds or other investment vehicles, and are 
often private investment partnerships. Because of hedge funds’ high risk and less 
regulation, they are available only to accredited wealthy investors who understand the 
risks. Hedge funds are actively managed and they charge higher fees for their services 
than mutual funds, the asset management fee is typically 2% and the incentive fee is 
20% (Titman & Tiu 2011). They can have strict lock-up periods and withdrawal limits, 
which make them illiquid investments. Hedge funds aim to make higher returns for 
their customers and may make aggressive high risk investments. The results are not 
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always better than the overall market and the performance persistence of those funds 
that have outperformed the market, is questionable (Agarwal & Naik 2000, Brown et 
al. 1999, Dichev & Yu 2011, Fung et al. 2008, Joenväärä et al. 2014, Kosowski et al. 
2007, Liang 2000, Nohel et al. 2010). 
Hedge funds take only accredited customers, the individual investor’s annual income 
must exceed 200 000 US dollars for the past two years or a net worth of 1 million US 
dollars or more, not including their own home. These qualifiers are for the investors 
own protection, as it is assumed that high income or net worth are buffer enough for 
the potential losses of high-risk investing. 
Hedge funds are less regulated than mutual funds (Stulz 2007). Hedge funds can invest 
in almost anything, they can short, they are not limited to only stocks and bonds, but 
can invest also in derivatives, land, real estate, and currencies, even cryptocurrencies, 
if the local legislation allows them. As private investment vehicles, hedge funds may 
invest their customer’s funds as they please, as long as they disclose their strategies 
with their customer. This results in both massive gains and massive losses, the trick is 
to identify the hedge funds that can make consistent excess returns. 
Hedge funds are more illiquid investments than mutual funds, their redemption terms 
can be strict and include lock-up periods. Mutual funds are liquid assets, from where 
the investor can redeem their investment on any business day and receive the net- 
asset-value of their investment. 
Hedge funds often use leverage to maximize their returns, but this combined with 
aggressive shorting can lead to massive losses that can end the fund. Hedge funds have 
incentive to try to manipulate the market, in legal ways of course, when they have 
heavy short positions in an asset. This resulted in January 2021 in an unusual situation, 
where social media group in Reddit noticed that the gaming company Gamestop’s 
stock was heavily shorted by hedge funds, and in order to save the company from 
plummeting market value, they raised awareness of the situation in social media 
amongst ordinary people, who in turn flocked to buy the share. Multiple exchanges 
halted trading of the stock, but the hedge funds kept shorting, the masses of small 
investors kept pumping the price by buying the stock, and eventually authorities had 
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to take stand in the matter. The aftermath of it all is still going, did some party act 
illegally or were the hedge funds losses due to their excessive short positions? This 
could be a topic of a whole another thesis, as it demonstrates the difference in old and 
new generations investing behavior and the power of movement of masses. The market 
has a new player, perhaps even new rules. 
Alas, in this thesis we are only trying to find a way to recognize the consistently 
outperforming hedge funds by studying how they have performed in different market 
conditions. 
Hedge funds can make speculative investments and investing in hedge funds can have 
some unique risks because of their strategies (Agarwall & Naik 2000, Till 2010). The 
use of leverage can turn minor losses into huge ones, investors might have to lock-up 
their money in the fund for several years, so the gains aren’t even liquid, and if the 
hedge fund uses only few strategies, it can expose the investments to greater risks 
because of low diversification. 
Then there’s the fact that the investor has to pay hefty fees for all these potential risks 
that may not even end up outperforming the market. Hedge funds typically use 2 and 
20 pay structure, which means that the fund manager gets 2% of the assets, whether or 
not he is able to generate wealth for his customers, and if the fund makes profit, the 
fund manager gets 20% of the yearly profits. It is understandable that the investors of 
hedge funds need to be wealthy and seasoned in investing, in order to make their own 
research before locking up their money in a fund for possibly years. Fortunately there 
are mechanisms to protect the investors, such as high-water mark, which means that 
the fund manager gets the 20% cut only from profits that exceed the previous highs. 
In the end everything is negotiable, including the fee structure, but supply and demand 
also works here, the more successful the fund, the more interested investors there are, 
and then the fund has the upper hand in negotiations. 
What should investors consider when doing their due diligence on hedge fund 
candidates? First, the investor has to know their own investment preferences and risk 
tolerance. After that they can limit down the number of fund candidates by choosing 
which strategies suit them. Metrics for analyzing the funds are many, but here are a 
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few regular ones; five-year annualized returns, standard deviation, rolling standard 
deviation, months to recovery/maximum drawdown, and downside deviation. 
The investor can follow some guidelines when narrowing down the hedge fund 
candidates. First, find out what are the annualized rates of return of the funds, and 
select a benchmark index you want the funds to have outperformed. This way the 
investor can rule out funds that haven’t performed well enough in the past. After 
looking into the returns, the investor should compare the standard deviations of the 
funds’ returns and compare those to the standard deviation of the benchmark index. 
Funds, that have higher standard deviation as the benchmark, will be dropped out of 
consideration at this point. Note that the compared funds should employ same 
strategies, no use of comparing different categories as they have different goals and 
time spans for those goals. Only funds, that meet the criteria for the return, the standard 
deviation, and peer comparison, are qualified for further consideration. There are still 
quite a few funds left and the investor needs to apply more criteria in order to choose 
the right fund for them. What are the differences between the funds that are left, what 
is the fund’s and firm’s size, what is the fund’s and it’s manager’s track record, how 
old is the fund, what is their minimum investment, what are their redemption terms, 
and what are their other terms of contract, if they are made public. 
Active management means that the investor’s portfolio is handled by professional 
money managers who actively buy, hold, and sell on behalf of the investor in order to 
outperform the overall market or chosen benchmark. The fund managers are financial 
professionals who make investment decisions based on investment analysis, research, 
forecast, and their own experienced views of the market. 
Passive management, or indexing, is an investment style, where the investment 
portfolios mirror their chosen market index, and the holdings are longer term than in 
active management. Passive management basically assumes that the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) is true, and the market is in itself at its most efficient. Whereas 
active management assumes that the EMH does not apply, and there are investment 
opportunities due to these inefficiencies in the market. 
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Active management requires constant adjustments to maintain its advantages, whereas 
passive management is buy-and-hold strategy that let’s market do the job. Active 
management requires more frequent rebalancing of the portfolios. Passive 
management assumes that the market already provides the best returns, and active 
management assumes that there are still ways to improve the returns. Actively 
managed funds, such as hedge funds, have higher fees than passive funds, such as 
mutual funds, so the actively managed funds not only need to outperform their 
benchmark, they need to outperform the benchmark and their own fee structure. 
Why would investors then pick actively managed funds? Well, the fund managers 
bring into the table their experience, and their knowledge of different investing 
instruments and strategies. Actively managed funds are less regulated and can 
therefore employ wider range of strategies, they also have less requirements on what 
assets they have to hold, so they can manage their risks more easily than passive funds. 
Active managers can also use hedging strategies such as short selling and using 
derivatives. 
Mutual funds are regulated investment products, and they are available for the 
common people. Hedge funds are available only for accredited investors. Hedge funds 
and mutual funds have their differences, but also similarities. They both pool funds 
from their customers for managed portfolios and the goal is the same. make money for 
their customers. 
In this thesis we try to identify if there are potential high-quality hedge funds with 
consistent performance persistence by researching how they have fared through 
different market conditions, through bear and bull markets. 
2.3 Review of hedge fund research 
As the world of hedge funds is so diverse, there is demand for finding the driving 
factors that are responsible for hedge fund performance and risk. A transition from 
conventional approach of researching hedge funds like asset classes to factor-based 
approach has taken years. The conventional approach to assessing hedge fund 
performance has been to compare the fund to a hedge fund index with similar investing 
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style. This benchmarking approach assumes that hedge fund indexes behave the same 
way as asset class indexes, but this can lead to misleading results.  
Also the databases from which those indexes are formed can be mispresenting because 
funds do not have to report to them. The databases have problems such as survivorship 
bias, data bias, sampling differences, short history and lack of transparency. In order 
to find the hedge funds’ underlying risk factors that don’t depend on the hedge fund 
databases, the asset-based style factors were introduced in 1997 (Fung & Hsieh 1997) 
and further developed into the more known 7-factor model in the following years 
(Fung & Hsieh 2001, Fung & Hsieh 2002, Fung & Hsieh 2004). 
Hedge funds are expensive with incentive fees of about 20% and management fees of 
2% and therefore they are expected to produce superior returns. Studies have provided 
mixed results on whether hedge funds can produce alpha and whether the performance 
will persist (Agarwal & Naik 2000, Brown et al. 1999, Dichev & Yu 2011, Fung et al. 
2008, Joenväärä et al. 2014, Kosowski et al. 2007, Liang 2000). These research have 
studied the performance persistence unconditionally without taking into account the 
time-varying aspect of hedge funds, but there has also been studies of conditional 
performance persistence (Sun et al. 2016).  
Because of hedge funds short history, only recently has there been studies about 
different market conditions’ effects on hedge fund performance persistence. The time-
variation of hedge fund performance and performance persistence is surprisingly new 
area in hedge fund research. The dot-com bubble and financial crisis have given a lot 
of data on which to study this question. 
The main inspiration for this thesis is an article ‘Only winners in tough times repeat: 
Hedge fund performance persistence over different market conditions’ (Sun et al. 
2016). The study shows that there exists predictability for hedge fund’s performance 
after weak markets but not after strong markets. The state of the market is divided into 
weak market performance and strong market performance based on the hedge fund 
sector’s return compared to its historical median, for this they’ve used TASS Dow 
Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund index. The study on performance persistence uses 
data from Lipper TASS database, and the fund performance is evaluated using Fung-
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Hsieh seven-factor alpha (Fung & Hsieh 2001), appraisal ratio, and Sharpe ratio. At 
the beginning of each quarter, the hedge funds are sorted to quintile portfolios by 
means, and then equal-weighted and value-weighted average buy-and-hold 
performance levels are computed for each portfolio for the subsequent three months to 
three years. Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for hedge fund 
characteristics that may affect future performance. 
Hedge funds differ from traditional asset classes in that they are more flexible with 
their investment strategies, and because of this the funds’ return distributions can differ 
from those of traditional asset classes. In order to study hedge funds, there needs to be 
proper models for these alternative investments. Perhaps the best known model for 
hedge fund benchmarking is the Fung Hsieh seven-factor model. The development of 
that model is described next. 
Fung and Hsieh (1997) show that hedge funds use dynamic trading strategies that 
differ substantially from mutual funds’ strategies. They identify five main investment 
styles for hedge funds: Systems/Opportunistic, Global/Macro, Value, Systems/Trend 
Following, and Distressed. They extend Sharpe’s asset class factor model with these 
style factors. 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) develop a new model for benchmarking trend-following hedge 
fund returns. They focus on trend-following funds from 1989 to 1997, and show that 
because hedge funds typically generate option-like returns, lookback straddles are 
more useful than linear-factor models in benchmarking the funds. Instead of using 
Sharpe’s asset class factor model, which is linear model, they develop a strategy for 
benchmarking trend-following hedge funds by forming portfolios of lookback 
straddles on bonds, currencies, and commodities.  
Fung and Hsieh (2002) validate their previous findings with out-of-sample study from 
1998 to 2001, and they widen their research from trend-following hedge strategies to 
other strategies. They examine what problems are yet to be solved before hedge fund 
returns can be linked to the underlying asset-based style factors.  
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Fung and Hsieh (2004) extend their previous work and develop a seven-factor model 
for benchmarking hedge funds. They solve the problems in their previous study, and 
find a way to link asset-based style factors to hedge fund returns in a way that is 
applicable to different hedge fund strategies. The seven asset-based style factors i.e. 
risk factors are bond trend-following factor, currency trend-following factor, 
commodity trend-following factor, equity market factor, size spread factor, bond 
market factor, and credit spread factor. The benefit of this model is that it makes 
possible to benchmark hedge funds to readily available indexes that don’t have the 
hedge fund databases’ biases, and the model reveals the underlying risk-factor 
exposures of hedge funds. 
Because of hedge funds’ short history and limited availability of hedge fund data, the 
studies have different databases, time periods, and methods, so it is not a surprise that 
the research results about hedge fund performance and the persistence of the 
performance are mixed. Some of the studies and their results are described next. 
Brown and Ibbotson (1999) find that offshore funds have positive risk-adjusted 
performance when measured with Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s alpha, but they do not find 
evidence of performance persistence. They use annual data from the U.S. Offshore 
Funds Directory to study offshore hedge fund performance from 1989 to 1995, and 
they include both defunct and operating funds in their study. They divide the funds 
into ten categories based on the fund’s investment style, and use the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) to calculate the fund’s alpha, and they also calculate the Sharpe 
ratios for the funds. To test the performance persistence, they use year-by-year cross-
sectional regression of past returns on current returns. 
Agarwal and Naik (2000) find that hedge fund performance persistence is highest at a 
short-term quarterly horizon, and the persistence weakens as the time frame is 
extended. The short-term returns are problematic because hedge funds can use lock-
up periods and thus hinder investors’ ability to gain from these short-term benefits. 
They study both offshore and onshore hedge fund performance persistence. The data 
is from Hedge Fund Research Inc (HFR), and covers monthly returns from 1982 to 
1998. Agarwal and Naik study hedge fund performance persistence using multi-period 
framework in addition to a more traditional two-period framework, that is, they 
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examine fund wins and losses in two and more than two consecutive time periods on 
a pre-fee and post-fee basis. They divide the funds the same way as Brown and 
Ibbotson (1999) into ten categories, but instead of CAPM they calculate the fund alpha 
as the difference of the fund’s return and the same category’s average return, and 
instead of Sharpe ratio, they use appraisal ratio. They examine if performance is 
sensitive to the length of return measurement, in this they use period-by-period cross-
sectional regression of past returns on current returns on quarterly, half-yearly and 
yearly basis. 
Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) examine funds-of-funds, and the results 
reveal that the risk exposures of funds change over time, and that funds-of-funds on 
average have produced alpha only between October 1998 and March 2000. They use 
merged monthly data from HFR, CISDM, and Lipper TASS, from time period from 
1995 to 2004, and calculate alphas once a year using Fung Hsieh seven-factor model 
on the most recent two year period. They divide the funds-of-funds into alpha-
producing funds-of-funds and to those that don’t produce alpha. The alpha-producing 
funds-of-funds have steadier capital inflows, they have more performance persistence, 
and they are less likely to be liquidated than those funds-of-funds that don’t produce 
alpha. 
Dichev and Yu (2011) find that hedge funds provide investors lower dollar-weighted 
returns than the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index, and only slightly higher returns 
than the risk-free rate of return. The monthly data they use is a combination of Lipper 
TASS hedge fund database and the database of Center for International Securities and 
Derivatives Markets (CISDM), and the time period is from 1980 to 2008. 
Conventionally hedge fund performance has been studied from the fund’s perspective, 
and thus the interest of the studies has been buy-and-hold returns. In this study, Dichev 
and Yu take the investor’s perspective and calculate the dollar-weighted returns, which 
takes into account the value-weighted returns over time by the amount of invested 
capital. This way they take into account the timing and the size of cash flows from 
investor into and out of the fund. 
Sun, Wang and Zheng (2016) examine conditional performance persistence of hedge 
funds, that takes into account the time-varying aspect of hedge funds. The study shows 
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that there exists predictability for hedge fund’s performance after weak markets but 
not after strong markets. This performance persistence holds both short-term (three 
months) and long-term (three years), and in future weak and strong markets. The state 
of the hedge fund market is divided into weak market performance and strong market 
performance based on the hedge fund sector’s return compared to its historical median, 
for this they’ve used TASS Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund index. The study on 
performance persistence uses monthly data from Lipper TASS database, and the fund 
performance is evaluated using Fung Hsieh seven-factor alpha (Fung & Hsieh 2001), 
appraisal ratio, and Sharpe ratio. At the beginning of each quarter, the hedge funds are 
sorted to quintile portfolios by means, and then equal-weighted and value-weighted 
average buy-and-hold performance levels are computed for each portfolio for the 
subsequent three months to three years. Multivariate regression analysis is used to 
control for hedge fund characteristics that may affect future performance. 
As hedge funds report their earnings on a voluntary basis, we get only a glimpse of the 
whole hedge fund universe, and that glimpse only consists of those hedge funds that 
want to be seen. All of the studies referred here agree on that the databases used in the 
studies have biases that can have an impact on the results, so the different databases 
and time periods may explain the differences in results. Studies on performance find 
both positive and negative alphas, and the persistence of returns is in most studies from 
nonexistent to short-term. Studies do find temporary abnormal returns in some of the 
funds, but as the characteristics of the winning funds vary from study to study, that 
result doesn’t tell us much about the hedge funds as a whole. The field is still looking 
for a consensus concerning hedge funds’ ability to produce alpha, and whether the 
performance persists. Further studies are therefore needed.  
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3 DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Data 
Data is from Lipper TASS hedge fund database, with 18891 hedge funds and 1261782 
observations from December 1993 to June 2013. The hedge funds are classified into 
11 self-reported style categories, which are; convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias, 
emerging markets, equity market neutral, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, global 
macro, long/short equity hedge, managed futures, multi-strategies, and fund-of-funds. 
Two thirds of the sample belong in the categories of long/short equities, and fund-of-
funds, rest are quite evenly divided between the remaining categories.  
These categories could be of interest in further studies of conditional performance 
persistence of hedge funds, but in this thesis we are more interested in overall market 
situations impact on performance persistence of hedge funds. The data is modified so 
that we’ve cleared out non-USD funds, non-monthly filing funds, and funds with 
unknown strategy. We’ve also excluded the first 18 months of returns for every fund 
to control the backfill bias. This leaves us with 9107 funds.  
3.2 Performance persistence measures 
In this thesis we use t-statistics of alpha as our measurement of returns, but before we 
get to that, let’s have a look on the usual measurements of return and risk. 
There are different types of returns, hedge funds usually seek absolute returns whereas 
mutual funds seek relative returns. This means that hedge funds try to maximize their 
returns despite the overall market situation, and mutual funds try to beat the overall 
market situation. Because hedge funds are so different from mutual funds, and can 
vary a lot amongst each other, the hedge funds’ performance needs more measures 
than those of mutual funds. Absolute returns are easier to compare with more 
traditional investments, but hedge funds should also be evaluated in terms of relative 
returns. We don’t want to invest in a hedge fund, that while making positive absolute 
returns, makes less returns than the overall market. We also don’t want to compare 
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some lower risk hedge fund to a totally different high-risk traditional investment, like 
emerging market equities. 
When we want to compare hedge fund to other funds, we need to examine the relative 
returns of the two over several time periods, and also take into account the risk-levels. 
In this thesis, we divide the hedge funds in ten portfolios, and examine the returns over 
three and twelve month time periods. Those funds, that stay in the top performing 
portfolios, can be considered to be able to consistently generate alpha, so their 
performance is persistent. 
3.2.1 Measures of risk 
We can’t be looking only at the returns, we need to take into consideration the risk-
level in the investment. This we can do by examining the risk-adjusted returns. So, 
when we need to measure the risk of the investment, there are several metrics to choose 
from, and here are few of the most used ones. 
Standard deviation is a way to measure the volatility of the investment, bigger standard 
deviation means that there is more variation in the returns compared to the mean return. 
The problem with standard deviation as a risk measure of hedge funds is, that it 
assumes normal distribution, and hedge funds rarely have symmetric returns. Also, 
standard deviation may not reveal if there are higher chances of huge losses.  
Formula for standard deviation: 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = √





where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖
𝑡ℎ𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 
?̅? = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑛 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 
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Because of standard deviation’s short-comings, we need to combine it with the mean 
returns, and we get the value at risk (VaR) measurement. Value at risk measures how 
much at most we are likely to lose, within five percent probability. There are multiple 
variations of the value at risk measurement. This still isn’t enough for hedge fund 
research, as value at risk also assumes normal distribution. 
We can’t assume normal distribution with hedge funds, so we have to examine the 
skewness and kurtosis of the fund’s return distribution. Skewness tells us how much 
the likely result differs from the mean value. Zero skewness means that the distribution 
of returns follows normal distribution, negative skewness indicates higher probability 
of negative result, and positive skewness indicates higher probability of positive result. 
Formula for skewness: 
𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =





where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
?̅? = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑁 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝜎 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Kurtosis measures the weight of the distribution’s tales compared to the whole 
distribution. High kurtosis indicates higher probability of extreme results, and lower 
kurtosis indicates higher probability of returns that are near the mean value.  
Formula for Kurtosis: 
𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑛 ∗
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
4𝑛
𝑖




where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
?̅? = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑁 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
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Sharpe ratio is used as hedge fund performance measurement of risk-adjusted returns, 
as it takes into account how much risk an addition to the returns comes with. Sharpe 
ratio takes into account the mean, standard deviation, and the risk-free rate.  A Sharpe 
ratio greater than 1 is considered good, and less than 1 not so good. Because Sharpe 
ratio takes the risk-free rate into account, the results vary between low- and high-
interest rate periods. 





where 𝑅𝑝 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
𝑅𝑓 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝜎𝑝 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜
′𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
In this thesis, the Sharpe ratio is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate from the 
return of the portfolio and dividing that result by the standard deviation of the 
portfolio’s excess return. Sharpe ratio in itself is does not hold enough explanatory 
power for hedge fund returns, that’s why we use additional metrics in evaluating the 
performance persistence. 
Beta is the measurement with which we compare the hedge funds to a benchmark 
index, which we’ve chosen to be S&P 500, as it is a good representation of the overall 
market. Beta is otherwise known as systematic risk and it measures how much a fund’s 
returns are likely to move compared to the benchmark index’s movements, thus the 
beta of overall market is 1. Beta is an important measurement as it shows us how 
sensitive our investment is to movements in compared asset class. 
Correlation measures relative changes in returns, it measures how related the returns 
of our investments are, do they react similarly to systematic variables or react opposite 
ways. Correlation can have a value between -1 and 1, where -1 means perfect negative 
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correlation, and 1 means perfect positive correlation, and zero means that the 
investments are independent of each other. 
Beta and correlation measurements can be used in hedging as a way to recognize assets 
that act opposite or neutral compared to our investments, and in comparing the funds 
in our portfolio against each other. After all, no point in investing in multiple asset 
classes, if they all go down at the same time, because there’s no diversification benefits 
in that. On the other hand, diversification also reduces returns, so the return goals 
should be bear in mind. 
3.2.2 Measures of return 
Alpha is the most widely used measurement of return in hedge funds, it measures the 
excess returns of the fund, how well the fund has fared in beating overall market or its 
chosen benchmark.  
First we take a look at the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
𝐸𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 
where 𝐸𝑅𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑅𝑓 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
When evaluating hedge funds, we can calculate the fund’s expected return by 
substituting the beta in the formula by the beta of the hedge fund. This way we can 
compare the fund’s performance to its expected return, and make conclusion whether 
or not the fund manager has been able to add alpha on the risk taken, instead of just 
increasing profits with more risk. 
Because alpha measures the excess return of an investment over its chosen benchmark, 
it is used in evaluating fund’s performance persistence. It tells us whether or not the 
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fund manager has been able to generate additional returns, not just the same returns as 
the overall market would have provided in passive investment. Also the excess return 
has to be big enough to cover the fees of active management, otherwise the customer 
might end up losing money compared to passive investing. 
We talked about efficient market hypothesis (EMH) earlier, it assumes that the market 
is always perfectly priced and there isn’t a chance to systematically earn excess returns 
by identifying undervalued assets. The research results on performance persistence 
have also been mixed, so the debate still continues whether or not active management 
can systematically beat the market. 
Note, that alpha should be used as a comparing measurement only between similar 
asset categories. Alpha is a measure of performance, it is the excess return between 
our portfolio and the market index. In our calculations, we use t-statistic of Fung Hsieh 
seven-factor alpha in order to get more robust results. 
3.3 Fung-Hsieh seven factor model 
Fung Hsieh seven-factor model (Fung and Hsieh 2001) and its variations are widely 
used in measuring hedge fund performance, but before we get to that, let’s take a look 
at arbitrage pricing theory (Ross 1976), and the development of Fung-Hsieh seven 
factor model. 
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) expresses asset expected return as a linear model 
of various macro-economic factors: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝑏𝑖1𝑅𝑃1 + 𝑏𝑖2𝑅𝑃2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛  (1) 
where 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 
𝑟𝑓 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑏𝑖𝑘 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑘 
𝑅𝑃𝑘 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑘 
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For each asset i, the sensitivity 𝑏𝑘 are estimated from regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖1𝑅𝑃1,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖2𝑅𝑃2,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑟𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑅𝑃𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑘 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖
′𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜   
(Fama and French 1996) 
In the formula (2) there is an intercept 𝛼𝑖 whereas in formula (1) there is none. Formula 
(2) uses realized returns 𝑅𝑖 and formula (1) uses expected return 𝐸(𝑟𝑖). Model (2) is 
the result of running regression on our data. From model (1) we can imply that the α 
of model (2) should be zero, in that case, all the excess returns would be explained by 
the risk factors. If α is something else than zero, it means that there are returns that are 
not explained by the risk factors, that is, there is abnormal risk adjusted returns. In 
hedge fund performance evaluation α is interpreted as the result of the hedge fund 
managers skills to create excess returns. If α of a hedge fund is positively significantly 
different from zero, then we can assume that the fund manager has been able to beat 
the market and add value to the fund. 
APT theory does not tell us which risk factors we should be using when evaluating 
hedge fund performance. To answer this question there’s been further studies to 
identify the suitable risk factors for hedge funds. Fama and French (1993) studied 
mutual funds and found three common factors; market, size, and value. Unfortunately 
these are not directly suitable for hedge fund research, as hedge funds can use dynamic 
trading strategies (Fung and Hsieh 1997). 
Fung and Hsieh developed models for hedge fund performance evaluation, and were 
able to identify first five (Fung and Hsieh 1997), then two more (Fung and Hsieh 2001) 
hedge fund risk factors. They constructed the widely used seven-factor model in 2004, 
and their model can explain up to 80% of the variations in hedge fund’s monthly 
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returns (Fung and Hsieh 2004). There have been further studies after this and more 
risk factors are identified (Teo 2009), but in this thesis we use the Fung Hsieh seven-
factor model as it has proven to have explanatory power for hedge fund returns. 
Fung Hsieh seven-factor alpha contains three trend-following risk-factors; bond trend-
following factor, currency trend-following factor, commodity trend-following factor. 
Two equity-oriented risk factors; equity market factor, and size spread factor. Two 
bond-oriented risk factors; bond market factor, and credit spread factor. 
Fung Hsieh seven-factor model: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑖+𝛽3𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 
𝛼0 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐵𝑖 = 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝐸𝑄𝑡 = 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝐸𝑆𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝐵𝑀 = 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝐵𝑆𝑡 = 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡′𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 
The Fung Hsieh seven-factor model is the econometric model in this thesis. The risk 
factors in our model are from David A. Hsieh’s hedge fund data library1, where the 
risk factors are available for academic research.  
                                                 
1 https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm 
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3.4 Chosen metrics and the research steps 
This thesis’ approach differs from the reference article’s (Sun et al. 2016) approach in 
that the original study divides the time series into weak and strong markets based on 
whether the overall hedge fund sector return is below or above its historical median, 
whereas we take a more common people approach and divide the time series into 
periods of recessions and expansions based on the overall stock market situation. The 
main recession periods are the dot-com bubble from 31st May 2000 to 30th September 
2002 and the financial crisis from 31st August 2007 to 28th February 2009. Otherwise 
the time periods between 30th June 1997 to 30th June 2013 are considered as expansion 
periods. 
The main steps in the research are: First we clear out non-USD funds, non-monthly 
filing funds, and funds with unknown strategy, and we exclude the first 18 months of 
returns for every fund to control the backfill bias. Then we calculate the logarithmic 
excess returns of the funds. After that, we use the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model 
(Fung & Hsieh 2001) over the past 12 months returns to estimate the time-varying t-
value of alpha for each fund. Next, we sort the funds into decile portfolios based on 
their t-values of alpha. We use t-statistics of alpha in order to increase robustness of 
the model. After that we calculate the monthly equal-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio 
alphas for the decile portfolios using three-month and twelve-month holding periods. 
We also calculate the monthly equal-weighted returns for the spread portfolio between 
the top and bottom portfolios. Next we calculate for the decile portfolios the annualized 
mean, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, t-value and p-value of Sharpe ratio, annualized 
Fung-Hsieh seven-factor alpha, t-value and p-value of alpha. The null-hypothesis is 
that there is no difference in performance persistence after recession and expansion 
periods.  
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4  DATA ANALYSIS 
Before dividing the data into portfolios, the average t-values of alphas by year are as 
such: 
 
Figure 1 Average t-values of alphas by year, before ranking the funds into portfolios. 
 
The average t-values of alpha vary in such way, that without prevailing information, it 
would be hard to spot the well-known recessions and expansions from the data. The 
dot-com bubble from 31st May 2000 to 30th September 2002 and the financial crisis 
from 31st August 2007 to 28th February 2009 can be seen in the graph if one knows to 
look for them. Further investigation is therefore needed.  
4.1 Portfolios 
The whole data is divided, based on their 12 month average t-value of alpha, into ten 
portfolios and one spread portfolio between the highest and lowest portfolios. Because 
of robustness, the t-value of alpha is chosen here instead of plain alpha. For all 
portfolios, we calculate the annualized mean, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, t-value 
and p-value of Sharpe ratio, annualized Fung-Hsieh seven-factor alpha, and t-value 
and p-value of alpha. 
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Table 1 Ranking portfolios based on their 12 month average t-value of alpha 
Portfoli
o 










10 -0.102 0.085 187 -1.207 -4.763 0.000 -0.128 -8.863 0.000 
9 -0.036 0.083 187 -0.429 -1.695 0.092 -0.063 -4.504 0.000 
8 -0.001 0.075 187 -0.016 -0.063 0.949 -0.026 -2.054 0.041 
7 0.026 0.076 187 0.346 1.367 0.173 0.002 0.137 0.891 
6 0.059 0.074 187 0.792 3.125 0.002 0.036 2.742 0.007 
5 0.073 0.070 187 1.048 4.135 0.000 0.052 4.094 0.000 
4 0.100 0.073 187 1.321 5.213 0.000 0.075 5.615 0.000 
3 0.118 0.066 187 1.786 7.049 0.000 0.104 7.966 0.000 
2 0.115 0.057 187 2.023 7.988 0.000 0.102 9.646 0.000 
1 0.125 0.042 187 2.986 11.786 0.000 0.115 13.842 0.000 
0 0.228 0.072 187 3.153 12.448 0.000 0.244 14.968 0.000 
 
After we have divided the funds into portfolios, we will check the portfolios 
performance after three months and rearrange the funds again into portfolios based on 
the new t-values of alpha. We duplicate these steps until the end of our data. We do 
the same procedure in twelve month intervals in order to see, if the three month and 
twelve month performance persistence are different. 
4.2 Three month performance persistence 
The funds are now divided into portfolios and the performance of the portfolios is 
calculated after three months and the portfolios are rearranged based on their new 
performance. 
Table 2 Post-rank three months statistics 
Portfoli
o 








10 -0.006 0.080 188 -0.074 -0.293 0.470 -0.025 -1.636 0.104 
9 0.016 0.073 188 0.214 0.848 0.398 -0.005 -0.415 0.678 
8 0.030 0.068 188 0.435 1.721 0.087 0.011 0.962 0.338 
7 0.034 0.071 188 0.471 1.864 0.064 0.011 0.949 0.344 
6 0.041 0.072 188 0.567 2.246 0.026 0.020 1.629 0.105 
5 0.039 0.071 188 0.543 2.148 0.033 0.018 1.488 0.139 
4 0.052 0.072 188 0.726 2.874 0.005 0.031 2.489 0.014 
3 0.053 0.071 188 0.756 2.994 0.003 0.032 2.593 0.010 
30 
2 0.075 0.061 188 1.226 4.854 0.000 0.058 5.254 0.000 
1 0.065 0.044 188 1.497 5.927 0.000 0.051 6.388 0.000 
0 0.071 0.064 188 1.118 4.427 0.000 0.076 4.979 0.000 
 
We can see from Table 2 that the difference between the mean of the best and the worst 
portfolios is getting smaller, so that might suggest that the performance persistence 
between portfolios is weakening. 
 
Figure 2 Post-rank three months alpha 
 
Only two portfolios have negative alpha after three months, and those alphas are better 
than before, so the worst portfolios must have performed better after three months. 
4.3 Twelve month performance persistence 
We want to compare the performance persistence between three and twelve months. 
This is why we do the same calculations again with the longer time period of twelve 
months. The funds are now divided into portfolios and the performance of the 
portfolios is calculated after twelve months and the portfolios are rearranged based on 
their new performance. 
 
31 
Table 3 Post-rank twelve months statistics 
Portfolio Mean Std N Sharpe t_Sharp
e 
p_Sharpe Alpha t_Alpha p_Alpha 
10 0.021 0.075 186 0.287 1.128 0.261 0.002 0.130 0.897 
9 0.025 0.065 186 0.381 1.498 0.136 0.008 0.685 0.494 
8 0.037 0.069 186 0.538 2.119 0.035 0.018 1.404 0.162 
7 0.043 0.068 186 0.626 2.465 0.015 0.024 2.005 0.046 
6 0.043 0.072 186 0.589 2.320 0.021 0.021 1.813 0.071 
5 0.034 0.071 186 0.478 1.880 0.062 0.012 1.072 0.285 
4 0.054 0.074 186 0.733 2.885 0.004 0.030 2.487 0.014 
3 0.045 0.073 186 0.620 2.442 0.016 0.021 1.640 0.103 
2 0.050 0.060 186 0.834 3.298 0.001 0.032 3.072 0.002 
1 0.052 0.048 186 1.068 4.206 0.000 0.037 4.218 0.000 
0 0.030 0.055 186 0.552 2.176 0.031 0.035 2.647 0.009 
 
The difference between means of the worst and the best portfolios is smaller after 
twelve months as it was after three months. 
Comparing the results after three and twelve months we can see that the performance 
persistence weakens with time, which is expected. 
 
Figure 3 Post-rank twelve months alphas 
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All of the portfolios have positive alphas after twelve months, so the performance 
overall is getting better during our time period. 
4.4 Performance persistence and market situation 
We want to find out whether the market situation has impact on the portfolio 
performance. Does the portfolios picked during crisis have different performance 
persistence than portfolios picked during boom? This is why we divide our data into 
bust and boom periods. The bust periods consist the dot-com bubble from 31st May 
2000 to 30th September 2002 and the financial crisis from 31st August 2007 to 28th 
February 2009. The boom periods consist of the rest of our data period from December 
1993 to June 2013. 
4.4.1 Bust vs boom market three month performance persistence 
We divide the funds into portfolios same way as in previous section, but with the 
difference that now our portfolios are picked either during bust or boom period. The 
performance of the portfolios is calculated after three months and the portfolios are 
rearranged based on their new performance. 
Let’s start by looking at the alphas of the portfolios during bust and boom periods.  
 
Figure 4 Bust market three month post-rank alphas 
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Figure 5 Boom market three month post-rank alphas 
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show us the portfolio’s alphas after three-month holding period 
during the bust and boom periods. From these we can see, that both graphs show 
obvious trend in alphas, but to interpret the performance persistence, we need to 
calculate the p-values of Sharpe and alpha and see if they are significant and do they 
differ greatly between bust and boom periods. So we cannot make conclusions about 
performance persistence based only in values of alpha. 
Next we calculate the p-values of Sharpe and alpha. 
Table 4 Bust market three month post-rank performance persistence 
Portfolio Mean Std N Sharpe t_Sharpe p_Sharpe Alpha t_Alpha p_Alpha 
10 -0.113 0.086 41 -1.318 -2.437 0.019 -0.076 -1.815 0.079 
9 -0.114 0.088 41 -1.286 -2.376 0.022 -0.075 -1.932 0.062 
8 -0.082 0.076 41 -1.081 -1.999 0.052 -0.032 -0.947 0.351 
7 -0.077 0.074 41 -1.046 -1.934 0.060 -0.022 -0.759 0.453 
6 -0.070 0.076 41 -0.919 -1.699 0.097 -0.010 -0.286 0.777 
5 -0.060 0.073 41 -0.824 -1.523 0.136 -0.006 -0.168 0.867 
4 -0.053 0.074 41 -0.712 -1.316 0.196 -0.005 -0.125 0.901 
3 -0.047 0.072 41 -0.644 -1.190 0.241 -0.002 -0.053 0.957 
2 -0.011 0.077 41 -0.137 -0.253 0.802 0.041 1.218 0.232 
1 0.004 0.054 41 0.068 0.125 0.901 0.045 1.764 0.087 
34 
0 0.117 0.067 41 1.744 3.224 0.003 0.121 2.816 0.008 
 
We do the same calculations, but pick the portfolios from boom period. 
Table 5 Boom market three month post-rank performance persistence 
Portfolio Mean Std N Sharpe t_Sharpe p_Sharpe Alpha t_Alpha p_Alpha 
10 0.021 0.077 128 0.275 0.899 0.371 -0.027 -1.440 0.153 
9 0.050 0.064 128 0.784 2.560 0.012 0.007 0.490 0.632 
8 0.063 0.063 128 1.004 3.280 0.001 0.018 1.228 0.222 
7 0.063 0.066 128 0.961 3.137 0.002 0.008 0.641 0.523 
6 0.070 0.066 128 1.053 3.440 0.001 0.019 1.338 0.184 
5 0.070 0.065 128 1.067 3.484 0.001 0.017 1.320 0.189 
4 0.078 0.063 128 1.236 4.037 0.000 0.026 2.032 0.044 
3 0.083 0.060 128 1.397 4.562 0.000 0.035 2.750 0.007 
2 0.096 0.051 128 1.904 6.218 0.000 0.060 5.076 0.000 
1 0.079 0.036 128 2.177 7.111 0.000 0.050 5.837 0.000 
0 0.057 0.062 128 3.013 3.013 0.003 0.077 4.063 0.000 
 
Comparing Table 4 and Table 5 we can see that portfolios with three-month holding 
period during the bust period has bigger difference between the mean of the best and 
the worst portfolios than in boom period, so there is more variety in portfolio outcomes 
in bust periods. This was expected, but is there a difference between the best portfolios 
in bust and boom periods? Are best funds keeping up their performance during 
recession? 
When we look at the Sharpe ratios and especially the p-values of Sharpe in our two 
tables, we can see quite the opposite results. In bust period the worst portfolios are 
showing statistically significant p-values of Sharpe, whereas in boom period the best 
portfolios have significant p-values of Sharpe. This indicates that in bust period, the 
worst portfolios are more persistent with their performance than the best portfolios, 
and in boom period the best portfolios outperform the worst, not just in performance, 
but in performance persistence as well. Although, there is the portfolio 1, i.e. the very 
best portfolio, which is the only one with positive mean and Sharpe after three-month 
holding period, so it is making profit, but it is not persistent. 
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Alpha results are similar in bust period, the worst portfolios are more persistent with 
their performance in three-month holding period than the best portfolios. The best 
portfolio has p-value of alpha which is almost significant, and it is almost the same as 
in worst portfolio, so the best and portfolios are as persistent with each other. In the 
boom period, the p-values of alpha are significant in the best portfolios, which means 
that the best portfolios are better at keeping up their performance than the worst 
portfolios. 
4.4.2 Bust vs boom market twelve month performance persistence 
Let’s see what happens to the same portfolios after twelve-month holding period. The 
performance of the portfolios is calculated after twelve months and the portfolios are 
rearranged based on their new performance. We are again comparing bust and boom 
period’s results to each other. 
Again we take a peek into what the portfolios’ alphas look like in our different periods. 
With the twelve-month holding period, the portfolios’ alphas have more variety during 
bust period than in boom period. There isn’t as obvious trend in bust period with 
twelve-month holding period as there was with the three-month holding period. This 
suggests that the performance persistence lessens with longer holding period. 
 
Figure 6 Bust market twelve month post-rank alphas 
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Figure 7 Boom market twelve month post-rank alphas 
 
We need to calculate the p-values of Sharpe and alpha in order to make any conclusions 
about the performance persistence. 
Table 6 Bust market twelve month post-rank performance persistence 
Portfolio Mean Std N Sharpe t_Sharpe p_Sharpe Alpha t_Alpha p_Alpha 
10 -0.110 0.063 35 -1.747 -2.984 0.005 -0.052 -2.032 0.052 
9 -0.095 0.070 35 -1.360 -2.322 0.026 -0.058 -1.509 0.143 
8 -0.071 0.070 35 -1.014 -1.732 0.092 -0.034 -0.798 0.432 
7 -0.082 0.071 35 -1.150 -1.965 0.058 -0.015 -0.453 0.654 
6 -0.084 0.083 35 -1.009 -1.724 0.094 -0.004 -0.103 0.919 
5 -0.090 0.083 35 -1.087 -1.857 0.072 -0.027 -0.712 0.483 
4 -0.079 0.071 35 -1.103 -1.883 0.068 -0.021 -0.614 0.544 
3 -0.088 0.077 35 -1.141 -1.949 0.060 -0.025 -0.735 0.469 
2 -0.070 0.073 35 -0.957 -1.635 0.111 -0.001 -0.037 0.971 
1 -0.043 0.060 35 -0.719 -1.228 0.228 0.010 0.340 0.737 




Table 5 Boom market twelve month post-rank performance persistence 
Portfolio Mean Std N Sharpe t_Sharpe p_Sharpe Alpha t_Alpha p_Alpha 
10 0.042 0.075 123 0.556 1.780 0.078 -0.008 -0.459 0.647 
9 0.045 0.062 123 0.724 2.318 0.022 0.003 0.236 0.814 
8 0.059 0.066 123 0.903 2.890 0.005 0.010 0.728 0.468 
7 0.067 0.065 123 1.031 3.300 0.001 0.020 1.378 0.171 
6 0.071 0.066 123 1.074 3.440 0.001 0.021 1.576 0.118 
5 0.068 0.062 123 1.106 3.542 0.001 0.026 2.068 0.041 
4 0.091 0.071 123 1.275 4.081 0.000 0.038 2.801 0.006 
3 0.087 0.063 123 1.382 4.425 0.000 0.046 3.577 0.001 
2 0.080 0.052 123 1.523 4.877 0.000 0.045 4.139 0.000 
1 0.074 0.042 123 1.762 5.640 0.000 0.049 5.278 0.000 
0 0.032 0.061 123 0.520 1.664 0.099 0.057 3.050 0.003 
 
First of all, we can see that in bust period, after twelve months holding period, every 
portfolio is at loss, so the performance persistence worsens when the holding period 
lengthens. In boom period the portfolio means go up as the holding period lengthens. 
In bust market, the p-value of Sharpe is significant only in the worst portfolios, where 
as in boom market, only the worst portfolio does not have significant p-value of 
Sharpe. This means that during bust periods, the worst portfolios persist being the 
worst with the most loss, and in boom period, their performance starts to vary more. 
The p-value of alpha has similar results, in bust period, the worst portfolios have 
smaller p-values, and in boom periods, the best portfolios have significant t-values of 
alpha. This means that in bust periods, the worst portfolios make persistently bad 
results, and the best portfolios do not have persistent performance. In boom period, the 
best portfolios are persistent with their performance. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim for this thesis was to study whether hedge fund performance persists after 
weak markets and does the results differ from performance persistence after strong 
markets.  
Even though there is some indications that the very best portfolios can make at least 
short-term profit even in bust periods, the performance is not persistent. All in all, it 
seems that the best portfolios have more varying outcomes during recession than the 
worst portfolios. During expansion, the best portfolios have good performance 
persistence whereas the worst portfolios outcomes vary more.  
What we can conclude from these results is that badly performing portfolios keep on 
performing badly despite the overall market situation, and the best portfolios can make 
consistent risk-adjusted excess returns only in good market situations. The results 
implicate that you cannot identify the skilled fund managers from others by looking at 
hedge fund’s performance during market crisis. 
The main inspiration for this thesis was an article ‘Only winners in tough times repeat: 
Hedge fund performance persistence over different market conditions’ (Sun et al. 
2016). The study shows that there exists predictability for hedge fund’s performance 
after weak markets but not after strong markets. Our results were similar, but not 
statistically significant. So, picking the best performing portfolio based on past 
performance during recessions does not guarantee that the outcome is favorable. This 
means that our null-hypothesis holds, and there is no statistically significant difference 
in performance persistence after recession and expansion periods. 
Further analysis of the hedge funds’ characteristics is needed to understand the 
underlying reasons for the differences in the results. 
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